Kurdish-Iraqi War

The First Kurdish–Iraqi War lasted from 1961 until 1970. Kurdish forces, led by Mustafa Barzani, attempted to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The war failed to resolve the issue of a Kurdish homeland despite the fact that the war inflicted over 100,000 casualties.  In 1958, a military coup d’état against the Hashemite Monarchy, led to the seizure of power by Abdul Karim Qasim. Qasim invited Barzani to return from exile in the USSR, hoping to gain the support of Kurdish militias.  As part of the new arrangement, Qasim promised Barzani complete regional autonomy in Kurdistan in return for Kurdish support for his government. Barzani, who was the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), agreed to the deal. By early 1960, it became apparent that Qasim would not follow through with his promise of regional autonomy. As a result, the KDP began to agitate for regional autonomy. In the face of growing Kurdish dissent, as well as Barzani's personal influence, Qasim’s government shifted its support to the Barzani clan’s historical rivals, the Baradost and Zebari tribes. The result of this pivot was a period of intense inter-tribal warfare between 1960 and 1961. By February 1961, Barzani had defeated the pro-government forces Kurdish tribes and consolidated his position as leader of all the Kurdish tribes. At this point, Barzani ordered his forces to occupy and expel Iraqi Arab officials from Kurdish territory. This was not received well in Baghdad, and as a result, Qasim began to prepare for a military offensive against the Kurdish region. Meanwhile, in June 1961, the KDP issued a detailed ultimatum to Qasim outlining Kurdish grievances and demanded rectification. Qasim ignored the Kurdish demands and continued planning for war. It was not until September 10, 1961 when an Iraqi army column was ambushed by a group of Kurds, that the Kurdish revolt truly began. In response to the attack, Qasim lashed out and ordered the Iraqi Air Force to indiscriminately bomb Kurdish villages, which ultimately rallied the entire Kurdish population to Barzani's standard. Due to Qasim's profound distrust of the Iraqi Army, which he purposely failed to adequately arm, Qasim's government was not able to subdue the insurrection. Of the sixteen members of Qasim's cabinet, twelve were Ba'ath Party members; however, the party turned against Qasim due to his refusal to join Gamel Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic. To strengthen his own position within the government, Qasim created an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party, which was opposed to any notion of pan-Arabism. The war’s stalemate irritated powerful factions within the military and is said to be one of the main reasons behind the Ba'athist coup against Qasim in February 1963. The Ba’athists had made earlier attempts, however, in 1959. The assassins, which included Saddam Hussein, planned to ambush Qasim on October 7, 1959: one man was to kill those sitting at the back of the car, the rest killing those in front. During the ambush it is claimed that Saddam Hussein began shooting prematurely, which disorganized the whole operation. Qasim's chauffeur was killed, and Qasim was hit in the arm and shoulder. The assassins believed they had killed him and quickly retreated to their headquarters, but Qasim survived. At the time of the attack the Ba'ath Party had less than 1,000 members. After the failed coup d’état, many Ba’athist fled to Syria, the ideological home of Ba’athism. After the failure of Syrian unification with Egypt in 1961, Syria was declared an Arab Republic in the interim constitution. On 23 August 1962, around 120,000 Kurds in Jazira were arbitrarily categorized as aliens, forcing them to either leave the country or register as foreigners in their own country. In addition, a policy of violent discrimination was launched against the Kurds. These policies coincided with the beginning of Barzani's uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan and the discovery of oilfields in the Kurdish inhabited areas of Syria.  These events led to a period of increasing violence, including an attack in which Syrian troops crossed the Iraqi border in pursuit of Barzani's fighters. These tensions and the failure of the Iraqi government to halt the war, led the Ba’athist elements within the government to stage a coup d’état.  The coup d’état itself occurred on February 8, 1963, the fourteenth day of Ramadan, and as a result is remembered as the 14 Ramadan Coup. The coup had been in its planning stages since 1962, and several attempts had been planned, only to be abandoned for fear of discovery. The coup began in the early hours of February 8, 1963, when the communist air force chief, Jalal al-Awqati was assassinated and tank units occupied the Abu Ghrayb radio station. Over the following two day a violent struggle unfolded with fierce fighting between the Ba’athist conspirators and pro-Qasim forces. Qasim took refuge in the Ministry of Defence, where fighting became particularly heavy. Communist sympathizers were widely mobilized to fight against the coup. The following day, Qasim offered to surrender in return for safe passage out of the country. His request was refused, and that afternoon he was captured and executed. His dead body was displayed on television by leaders of the coup soon after his death. Around 5,000 Iraqis were killed in the fighting and an unknown number of communist sympathizers were rounded up during a CIA sponsored hunt for communists. The Ba’athist forces lost 80 men during the fight.

Writing in his memoirs of the 1963 coup, long time CIA analyst Harry Rositzke presented it as an example of one on which they had good intelligence in contrast to others that caught the agency by surprise. According to Rositzke, the Ba’athists had kept CIA informed of every step in the process of the coup d’état.  "Agents in the Ba’ath Party headquarters in Baghdad had for years kept Washington au courant on the party’s personnel and organization, its secret communications and sources of funds, and its penetrations of military and civilian hierarchies in several countries. CIA sources were in a perfect position to follow each step of Ba’athist preparations for the Iraqi coup, which focused on making contacts with military and civilian leaders in Baghdad. The CIA’s major source, in an ideal catbird seat, reported the exact time of the coup and provided a list of the new cabinet members. To call an upcoming coup requires the CIA to have sources within the group of plotters. Yet, from a diplomatic point of view, having secret contacts with plotters implies at least unofficial complicity in the plot." The best evidence that the U.S. was complicit is the memo from NSC staff member Bob Komer to President John F. Kennedy on the night of the coup, February 8, 1963. The last paragraph of the memo reads: "We will make informal friendly noises as soon as we can find out whom to talk with, and ought to recognize as soon as we’re sure these guys are firmly in the saddle. CIA had excellent reports on the plotting, but I doubt either they or UK should claim much credit for it. The new government used lists, provided by the CIA, to systematically arrest several thousand suspected communists.  According to former CIA Near East Division Chief James Chritchfield, the CIA took interest in the Ba'ath Party around 1961-2, and "was better informed on the 1963 coup in Baghdad than on any other major event or change of government that took place in the whole region in those years;" however, it did not "actively support" the coup.

In November 1963, after considerable infighting amongst the civilian and military wings of the Ba'athists, they were ousted by Abdul Salam Arif in a coup. Then, after another failed offensive on Kurds, Arif declared a ceasefire in February 1964, which provoked a split among Kurdish urban radicals on one hand In 1966, the Iraqi government launched a last-ditch effort to defeat the Kurds. This campaign failed when Barzani forces thoroughly defeated the Iraqi Army at the Battle of Mount Handrin, near Rawanduz. At this battle alone, Kurdish peshmerga reportedly killed over 5,000 Iraqi infantrymen. Recognizing the futility of continuing this campaign, Rahamn Arif announced a 12-point peace program in June 1966, which was not implemented due to the overthrow of Abdul Rahman Arif in a 1968 coup by the Ba’ath Party, which included key figures from the 1963 coup, Ahmed al-Bakr and his cousin Saddam Hussein. The Ba'ath government restarted a campaign to end the Kurdish insurrection, which again stalled in 1969. The Soviet Union pressured the Iraqis to come to terms with Barzani and a peace plan was announced in March 1970 which provided for some Kurdish autonomy. Despite this, the Iraqi government embarked on an ethnic cleansing program, which included the usage of chemical and biological warfare, especially in the oil rich regions of Kirkuk. Saddam Hussein remained in control of Iraq until 2003.